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THE I4I2 CASPE ARBITRATION: 
]USTICE, PLEBISCITE, OR MANIFEST DESTINY? 
CURT WITTLIN 
1. THE HISTORICAL FACTS 
In 1387, King Pere III died in Barcelona, having reigned fifty-one years 
over Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands. His first 
wife, Leonore of Sicily, had given him two sons, the future kings Joan 
l and Martí I, and a daughter, Leonore. The daughter married Juan l of 
Castile, to whom she bore Enrique and Fernando. Pere's marriage 
with Sybil of Fortià brought forth Isabel, married later to Jaume, 
Count of Urgell, grandson of a brother of Pere III. 
Pere was succeeded by his son Joan, twice married to noble ladies 
from France. Ten of his children died in infancy. Only Louis II of 
Anjou grew to adulthood, and became the father of Louis III, Duke of 
Calabria. Joan wore the nickname "the Hunter," of tragic foreboding: 
he died in a hunting accident in 1395. 
His brother, Martí I, inherited the crown. Martí's son, also named 
Martí, was given in marriage to Maria of Sicily, and then became king 
of that island. In March 1409 the crown-prince won a decisive battle 
over Sardinia, but died three days later. He left behind one infant son, 
Frederic, borne by a concubine. 
The widowed King Martí was pressured to remarry. He had his 
grandson Frederic accepted by the Sicilians as their new king and 
started proceedings to have him legitimized as heir of the Crown of 
Aragon. But in late March 1410, in Barcelona, Martí fell sick with the 
plague. At eleven o'clock of his last night, a somewhat irregular 
delegation from the parliarnent of Catalonia came to him with the 
question: "Is it your wish that ... the succession go to the person to 
whom it rightfully belongs?" ("Plau-vos que la successió .. . pervinga a 
aquell que per justícia deurà pervenir?," Soldevila 35, cf. PidaI39). The 
dying king agreed, uttering just one word, for whatever reason in 
Provençal: "Hoc." 
This "Hoc" led to the people being told that the king's last wish 
had been that the parliaments of the four parts of the kingdom meet in 
a General Assembly to determine the rightful heir to the crown. 
However, it quickly became obvious that there was no hope that, 
without a king, cortes generales would corne together. The procedure 
which was suggested instead was, that each of the three parliaments 
-the Balearic Islands, never invited, did not wish to participate- select 
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a small number of delegates, who would designate nine honest men, to 
be charged with the final decision. That "Committee of Nine" should 
then meet in Caspe, listening to the emissaries of the six contenders to 
the throne, before selecting the rightful heir to Martí's crown. Their 
decision from June 1412 came to be known as Compromiso de Caspe, 
not because there was any "compromise" involved, but because all 
participating regional parli aments had given their word -estaban 
compromisos- to accept the arbitration of the nine supposedly 
unprejudiced genealogists. 
The Catalan parliament moved to Tortosa, to be closer to where 
the politicians of the two other regions were gathered. The Valencians 
were divided, three diHerent factions holding meetings in various 
towns. The parliamentarians of Aragon were not united either. Still, 
the group assembled in Alcañiz took the lead in the proposed 
procedure and, in February 1412, compiled a list of all nine arbitrators 
and sent it to Tortosa. The Catalan parliament wanted to make just one 
substitution, but it was rejected out of hand by the Aragonese 
ambassador. And so, ad evitandum rupturam que alias non poterat 
evitari, ("in order to avoid a break-up, which otherwise would have 
been unavoidable," cit. Soldevila 120), the Catalans agreed to the 
original list. The nine men settled into the castle of Caspe on March 
29th. On June 28th they announced their decision. The rightful 
successor to King Martí was declared to be Fernando of Antequera, 
son of Juan l of Castile and of Martí's aunt Leonore, the brother of 
King Enrique of Castile. 
Fernando lived only till 1416. He was succeeded by his first son, 
Alfonso V, who, in 1458, passed on the crown to his brother Juan 11. 
Juan's son from his second marriage, called Fernando like his 
grandfather, became king in 1479. He married Isabel, the daughter of 
his father's cousin, who became Queen of Castile in 1474. It was only 
with this couple, the "Reyes Católicos," that the crowns of Castile and 
of Aragon were federated. 
2. THE INTERPRETATION OF THESE FACTS 
BY RAMÓN MENÉNDEZ PIDAL 
My summary of the historical events surrounding the Caspe 
Arbitration took only two pages. Of course, the same story can be told 
in lengthy monographs, by ad ding details, explanations and 
interpretations. Which historical materials, among the great many they 
can choose from, historians select and which ones they omit depends 
on their personal preferences. 
That is why two historians, even though they agree on the 
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authenticity of the documents available, can present the same facts in 
two quite different lights. 
The two historians with book-Iength studies of the Caspe 
Arbitration l arn alluding to are Ramon Menéndez Pidal and Ferran 
Soldevila. Pidal wrote his essay El compromiso de Casp e, 
Autodeterminación de un pueblo as Introduction to volume XV of the 
Historia de España, published under his editorship; Soldevila 
answered Pidal with a book issued the following year, entitled El 
compromís de Casp. (Resposta al Sr. Menéndez Pidal). Soldevila, fifty 
years earlier, had been a student of Don Ramón. His admiration for 
the ninety-four year-old grand mas ter can be seen in the res traint he 
uses in his "counter-attack." 
Let us start with an example of what kind of details Pidal 
resurrects from oId documents. The decision announced by the Nine 
in Caspe, the "happy news" ("feliz noticia," Menéndez Pidal 128), was 
carried by a rider to the Catalan parlamentarians waiting 95 kilometers 
away in Tortosa in just seven hours; that is, with an average speed of 
over 13 km per hour. Why should Pidal bother to calculate the average 
speed of the messenger? Does he want to justify his describing the 
rider as "bursting with enthusiasm" ("rebosando entusiasmo," ibid., 
or is he insinuating that this was a miracle? Indeed, the officialletters 
sent to all major towns, extoll "the miraculous harmony" ("la 
miraculosa concordia") with which the nin e experts had reached their 
conclusion. It is quite possible that in 1412 many people believed their 
preachers who told them that God had spoken through the nin e 
honest men in Caspe. While Pidal's catholicism was not strong enough 
to make him believe in direct divine intervention in human politics (see 
Pérez 1991), his believe that Fernando's access to the crown of Aragon 
was just one more step in the unstoppable rebuilding of the Visigothic 
kingdom has many aspects of a religious conviction. 
According to Pidal's account, the news from Caspe was also 
received with general rejoicing in Valencia. However, he then relates 
how, half a year later, saint Vicent Ferrer, the most famous man on the 
Committee of Nine and its spokesperson, arrived in Valencia with 
forty other friars and gave sermons "defending the miraculous 
agreement reached in Caspe and in praise of the king elect" (" en favor 
del milagroso acuerdo de Caspe y en elogio del Rey elegido," Pidal 
131). Ferrer was obviously aware that many Valencians would have 
"voted" -to use an anachronism Pidal invites by calling the 
Arbitration an "autodeterminación de un pueblo"- for their own 
Duke of Gandia, Alfons, great-grandson of King Martí's great-
grandfather, or else for Jaume of Urgell, or else for young Frederic of 
Sicily. Saint Vicent ridicules the followers of that unlucky boy for 
chanting "like birds: Frederic, Frederic!" ("les aus ho dien: Frederic, 
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Frederic!," ibid.). He defends the electÏon of Fernando of Castile, son 
of Martí's sister, by pointing out that King Salomon had been crowned 
by his mother, and that Jesus Christ had inherited the kingdom of 
David from his mother Mary. 
I have no doubts that Saint Vicent had used the Bible in this way 
already in discussions among the Nine in Caspe. But I can not believe 
what Pidal implies in several passages (for instance p. 122): that Ferrer 
advocated abolishing the regional tradition of dynastic succession by 
male lineage only out of a concern for Christian justice, because he was 
an early defender of women's rights. Ferrer went to great lengths to 
show that Fernando was not really a foreigner in King Martí's 
domains. "He is actually half Aragonese, half Valentian," he declared; 
"his father, Juan I, was conceived when his parents were travelling in 
the Kingdom of Valencia ... , where he then grew up" ("es aragonés y 
valenciano ... Su padre, Don Juan de Castilla, fue concebido en el Reino 
de Valencia ... y criado en este Reino," Menéndez Pidal 131). And as 
Ferrer had already done in a speech in Caspe, he defends also in a 
sermon in Valencia Ferrando's election by alluding to his qualities of 
character. "He keeps no concubines," he affirmed, obviously alluding 
to Frederic's illegitimate birth, "and when he got married he was still a 
virgin" ("no tiene amigas; fue virgen al matrimonio," ibid. 
Since Pidal finds space to enliven his essay with details like these, 
his omitting much more important facts becomes a serious matter. He 
very much avoids giving his full due to the true kingmaker: Pedro de 
Luna, the Aragonese anti-pope Benedict XIII. When in 1409 the 
French withdrew their allegiance from Pedro, the Castilian and 
Aragonese kings were the only supporters he had left. Young Frederic 
of Sicily, once legitimized, was of interest to the Pope because he could 
have educated the lad according to his own designs. But after Martí's 
death Pedro had to reevalute what his situation would be under each 
of the pretenders to the Crown. In June 14II, while Pope Luna was 
under siege in Avignon, Fernando sent an ambassador to him with an 
offer to dispatch soldiers to his rescue, in exchange for three promises: 
that a specific person become archbishop of Saragossa, that Pedro 
support him as successor to King Martí, and that he prevent a certain 
bishop from participating in meetÏngs concerning the succession (letter 
and commentary in Perarnau 1986a). But the anti-pope had to flee 
Avignon and take refuge in the fortress of Penyíscola, north of 
Valencia. He now had to prevent the Crown of Aragon from going to 
a contender with leanings towards France. Pedro de Luna, still a 
powerful figure in Spain, threw his full support behind Ferrando. 
Fernando -who had not shown much optimism as long as he 
thought that a General Assembly of all regional parliaments would 
elect Martí's successor- now sensed his chance. He put Berenguer de 
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Bardají, the most influential lawyer in the Aragonese parliament, on 
his payroll. With the Pope Luna's help it became possible to engage the 
charismatic Vicent Ferrer, who at the time was preaching in Castile, 
including, twice, at Fernando's court. Friar Vicent, more preoccupied 
by the imminent corning of the Antichrist than by politics, was 
acceptable to all as arbitrator. The honour to go first in declaring his 
vote went to him, upstaging an archbishop and the bishop of Huesca. 
After Vicent had spoken in favor of Fernando, five of the other eight 
electors -one being Vicent's brother, prior of a convent near Valencia, 
from where came also a second elector- limited themselves to saying: 
"Me too" (Pidal II9). The sixth, the Archbishop of Tarragona, stated 
that he considered Fernando the most "useful" (útil) of the candidates, 
but that from a strictly legal point of view he would have to vote either 
for Jaume of Urgell or for Alfons of Gandia, both related to the 
defunct king by strictly mal e lineage. The seventh genealogist, a lawyer 
from the Catalan parliament, was in favor of Jaume of Urgell, but 
added that his gout and other pains had prevented him from giving the 
matter sufficient thought. The last elector, finally replacing a member 
from Valencia too senile to attend meetings, abstained from voting (for 
details see Soldevila 141, Menéndez Pidal II9). 
If a woman can transmit the right to inherit a crown -as had 
happened often in the history of Castile, but not in that of the Crown 
of Aragon- Fernando was indeed the closest relative of Martí of 
legitimate birth. Saint Ferrer offered the electors a biblical justification 
for disregarding the regional tradition of dynastic succession by male 
lineage only. However, their decision can not be called an 
"autodeterminación de un pueblo." The people did not vote, the 
regional parliaments did not vote, and the nine arbitrators were 
expected to decide the question according to their best legal 
knowledge. Even if their decision did coincide with the vox populi, it 
can not be called a plebiscite. The genealogists' decision could have 
been very much at odds with the personal preferences of politicians 
and of the people. To claim, as Pidal do es in the dithyrambic last words 
of his essay, that that "autodeterminación" was realized "por un 
pueblo en evolución, que se desfeudaliza ... , un pueblo que se muestra 
consciente de sus derechos y de sus deberes, penetrado de su unitari o 
destino hispanico" (164), is, in my opinion, not onIy bad rhetoric, but 
also false. There is no historical basis to suggest that King Martí's 
subjects "had evolved to the point of wanting to free themselves from 
feudalism, conscious of their rights and duties, feeling deep down that 
their destiny lay in an united Spain." 
In all three scenarios -plebiscite, election by representative 
parliamentarians, and arbitration by a comrnittee- the cards were 
stacked in favor of Fernando. Not only was he Martí's clos est relative 
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if female lineage was allowed, not only did he appear -in the words of 
saint Vicent- "born to be king" ("era de tanta dignidad en su rostro y 
aspecto que parecía nacido para reinar," Pidal 130), he also had the 
Aragonese pope on his side. And, finally, he had his soldiers stationed 
in Aragon and Valencia. Pidal do es not hide this fact, but he finds 
nothing wrong with it. Jaume of Urgell also had troops patrolling 
those two regions, but Pidal calls the Castilians "police for justice" 
("policías de la justicia") and states that "el conde de Ur gel invade y 
Fernando defiende" (61; cf. Soldevila II4), which I arn tempted to 
translate as "The soldiers of one candidate attempted to disturb the 
free elections; but the other candidate volunteered his men so that the 
people could vote in peace." Fernando had kept his soldiers outside 
the borders of Aragon until the Archbishop of Saragossa was 
ambushed and murdered by a lawless clique of adherents of Jaume of 
Urgell. Only then did Fernando, "with good and saintly intentions" 
("buena y santa intención," Menéndez Pida175), send fifteen hundred 
Castilian soldiers into Aragon, "to help their parents and friends who 
were avenging the murder of the Archbishop... They limited 
themselves to stopping those who tried to block the democratic 
process" ("las gentes castellanas que entraron en Aragón son parientes 
o amigos de los que persiguen a los matadores del Arzobispo .. . No 
hacen sino contener a los que qui eren estorbar la acción de los 
Parlamentos," Menéndez Pidal 85). So much naiveté in a historical 
essay is disarming. Worse, in my opinion, is the internal contradiction 
in Pidal's thinking. He considers Fernando justified in letting his 
subjects uphold the archaic tradition of family vendettas, while 
considering the Caspe Arbitration proof that the people in King 
Martí's domains had evolved away from medieval feudalism and anti-
feminism. (According to J. Vicens Vives (1956), the Eastern Peninsula 
was indeed ahead of Castile in its social and economic evolution, 
making a political union with the center advantageous.) 
Pidal is on somewhat more solid ground when he claims that the 
unification of the Peninsular kingdoms was an enduring dream of the 
kings of Castile, who believed that there had been once a strong and 
united Hispania under the Visigoths in the seventh century. However, 
he goes too far in stating that "the Trastamara dynasty of Castile was 
especially interested in rekindling and consolidating the idea of the 
unity of Spain" ("Los Trast<Ímaras de Castilla tuvieron como particular 
preocupación el avivar y reafirmar la idea de la unidad hispana," 157). 
José-Luis Martín, in an article from 1975, exposes the weekness of 
Pidal's arguments. For instance, he shows that it is not true that every 
one of the nine royal marriages concluded in the years between 
Enrique 11 and Enrique IV was planned in order to tie the other four 
Peninsular kingdoms to Castile. In my opinion, the rather sudden 
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push by Fernando to gain Martí's crown could have been a 
consequence of Castile having lost the battle of Aljubarrota in 1385, 
which lead to the peace treaty from 14II, which reaffirmed Portugal's 
independence. The expansion in the East compensated Castile for this 
loss in the West. 
While it is doubtful that Fernando was guided in his actions by the 
Visigothic myth, it is unbelievable that the people of King Martí's 
domains were even aware of it. But it would be equally anachronistic 
to suggest that they shared a strong sense of forming a distinct 
Catalan-speaking society. Pidal's obsession ("idea fija," Martín 360) 
with his dogma of the "Spanish-ness" both of the Romans living in 
Hispania -for instance the philosopher Seneca!- and of the Visigoths, 
grew out of a psychological need to believe in twenty centuries of 
glorious past for the Spanish nation and in Castile's mission to rebuild 
that one great whole (see p. 75). 
Pidal's messianic wishful thinking reminds me of the doctrine of 
"manifest destiny," the belief that it was preordained that America 
should become one great nation from the Atlantic to the Pacifico The 
geographic compactness of the Iberian Peninsula must have caused 
manya person to think that it, to o, should form a political unit. Seeing 
in the ephemeral Visigothic kingdom the first incarnation of an eternal 
Hispanic national spirit is just as absurd as trying to prove that the 
"reyes católicos" descended from those ancient kings. A whole book 
could be compiled with historical statements about Castile's "right" to 
whatever territory was believed to have belonged to the Visigoths, but 
one example must suffice. In 1478 Rodríguez de Almela wrote: 
"Portugal belongs by right to our King and Queen ... May we see them 
one day monarchs of the whole of Hispania ... just as once were the 
illustrious Gothic kings, their ancestors!" ("El dicho regno de 
Portugal pertenece de derecho a los dichos .. . rey e reina, nuestros 
señores ... E los ve amos reyes e señores monarcas de toda España ... 
como lo fueron los nobles reyes godos de España pasados, sus 
progenitores," see Mackenzie 26). In 1580, when Portugal entered, for 
sixty years, their "Babylonian captivity" under Spanish rulers, many 
an exulting Castilian speaker belabored the theme that the historical, 
logical, just, ineluctable, self-evident, etc., political unity of the whole 
Peninsula had finally been reestablished. 
Pidal is aware that he can not use the myth of Spanish unity under 
the Visigoths as justification for Castile's expansionist ambitions in the 
Eastern Peninsula without explaining why Portugal should have 
remained independent. In one of the most disappointing passages of 
his essay he writes: "Portugal rejected Castile ... and lived in constant 
fear of being reabsorbed by Castile, while the County of Barcelona 
united fraternally with the Kingdom of Aragon -that is, the center of 
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the Península (sic!)- and lived in permanent brotherly bilingualism 
with Aragon, as part of the great Toledan Monarchy, which was about 
to be rebuilt. This is why in the librari es of Pere III and Martí l we can 
find some books about the Goths, and many more about the history 
of Castile" ("Portugal... repeliendo a Castilla ... temiendo siempre ser 
reabsorbido por Castilla; rnÍentras el Condado de Barcelona se asoció 
fraternamente al Reino de Aragón, esto es, al centro peninsular, y vivió 
siempre en hermandad bilingüe con él, como parte de la gran 
Monarquía toledana en tramite de reconstrucción: de ahí el recuerdo 
de los Godos y la preponderancia de Castilla en la colección 
historiografica de Pedro IV y Martín I," 152). In other words, Pidal 
concludes from the fact that Pere and Martí owned a few books about 
the history of Spain that they -and their subjects!- shared Castile's 
dream of reestablishing an united Península on the Visigothic model. 
l agree with Pidal that many nineteenth-century Catalan 
historians distorted the facts surrounding the Caspe Arbitration in 
their romantic fantasizing about how CatalonÍa's history would have 
been different had Jaume of Urgell inherited Martí's crown (see 
bibliography in Dualde 263-279). But their excesses were not repeated 
by historians of Pidal's rime. The fact that most of Pidal's Catalan 
colleagues did not hide their feeling that the regional tradition of 
dynasric succession by male lineage only should have been maintained, 
does not discredit them as objective historians. 
Pidal, on the other hand, believes that the end, the re establishment 
of that presumed glorious "Spanish" nation under the Visigoths, 
justified all the means of dubious legality employed by Fernando. His 
blind belief that this myth was the driving force behind Castilian 
politics in the Middle Ages led Pidal not only to confuse cause and 
effect, but to comrnÍt a historian's worst sin: exercising prejudice in the 
selection and interpretarion of documents. It is to be regretted that his 
Introduction to volume XV of the Historia de España was ever 
printed. This is also the conclusion of José-Luis Martín in his article 
"El método histórico de Menéndez Pidal y el Compromiso de Caspe." 
He states: "I sincerely believe that, had Menéndez Pidal lived a few 
more years, that essay would have turned out to be totally useless and 
unneccessary" ("Creo sinceramente que de haber vivido Don Ramón 
Menéndez Pidal unos años mas este artículo habría resultado 
absolutamente inútil e innecesario," 366). But l do not share the view 
that an even older Pidal would have seen the weakness of his essay on 
the Caspe Arbitration. Pidal liked writing those popularizing 
Introductions to the big volumes of the Historia de España, having 
published his first one as early as 1935. The one he added to volume 3, 
where he wrote about La España visigoda, was strongly critisized by 
his friend Américo Castro, who told Pidal in two letters in 1944 and 
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1945: "Once again: I regret to see that you waste your tim e with your 
Introductions... / Do not think that your historical introductions 
convince anyone. Write on (linguistic topics) and forget prehistory!" 
("Vuelvo a lamentar lo de sus prólogos perdedores de tiempo ... / No 
piense que con prólogos de historia va a convencer a nadie ... Dénos 
(follow examples of linguistic topics) ... y olvídese de la prehistoria!," 
quoted in Pérez 363). 
But in 1996 Pidal's essay on the "autodeterminación de un pueblo" 
was reprinted, without the slightest preliminary caveat lector. Pidal 
himself had considered the topic "materia muy batallona" (see letter in 
Pérez 495). By this he me ant not so much that the topic was 
controversial, but that he was spoiling for a fight. In my opinion, the 
"people" Pidal refers to -that is the citi zens of Aragon, Catalonia, 
Valencia and the Balearic Islands- were right in rejecting his 
tendentious interpretation of their history, and they would be justified 
today to consider the reprint of the essay from 1964 a gratuitous 
provocation. However, the reprint is probably just yet another 
example of official and bureaucratic carelessness concerning the 
feelings of citizens of regions with a self-perception distinct from the 
one of the majority. It is comparable to the insensitivity of the 
government which kept coins honoring Franco in circulation for 
twenty-two years after the dictator's death; until 1997 -when they were 
replaced with coins showing Felipe V, the king who abolished the 
traditionallaws and rights of Catalonia and Valencia. 
3. Two VISITS TO CASPE IN 1993 
I would like to add a postscript. On October 21, 1993, I was in 
Barcelona when the King and Queen of Spain made a visit to Caspe. 
No journalist explained how that event was justified. I could not avoid 
a suspicion that there were some dark forces at work, maybe a plot to 
provide the King with a platform from which to reaffirm Spanish 
unity. The newspapers I consulted gave only brief descriptions of the 
visit, but mentioned that the presidents of the Catalan and Valencian 
autonomous regions, cordially invited, did not attend. 
I wanted to find out more about all this. Why should the royal 
couple visit Caspe on a cold October day in a year which was not even 
a centenary of 14J2? A couple of weeks later I took a slow train to 
Saragossa and got oH at that sleepy town in the Ebro valley. At the 
small public library I was handed a folder with newspaper clippings 
about the memorable event. The regional newspaper, La Comarca, had 
all the information I needed. 
On May 20th 1990, the city fathers of Caspe had decided to invite 
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the royal couple. The letter of invitation gives three reasons why the 
King should consider visiting them. 1. He should remember that it was 
in Caspe that the great transformation of the country began from 
which all people under Juan Carlos' crown now profit, "while the 
good burghers from Caspe have never received any thanks for it" ("sin 
que nuestro pueblo haya recibido ningún gesto de reconocimiento"). 
2. Caspe was always a faithful supporter of the Bourbon dynasty. 3. 
Caspe, fallen on hard times, could profit from the prestige of a royal 
visit, which would help attract industries and tourism, while raising 
the morale of the "caspolinos." 
So much for my suspicion that behind the visit of the King of 
Spain to Caspe there were dark forces at work. The trip was just a 
demonstration that the King cares about his loyal subjects. The 
speeches were pretty much of the recyclable variety, and what was said 
about the 1412 Arbitration can be re ad in any Spanish schoolbook. 
What turned out to be the King's most memorable phrase was: "Spain 
is strong when her towns, cities and autonomous regions are strong" 
("España se hac e fuerte cuando sus pueblos, ciudades y comunidades 
son fuertes"). 
The mayor of Caspe seemed to have used the original letter of 
invitation quoted above as the basis for his allocution. He echoed Pidal 
in mentioning the "ideales utópicos de fraternidad, so1idaridad y 
amor" which, he said, were at work in 1412, but then he got carried 
away when he called the ArbitratÏon "the first unifying and federal 
Constitution, in which Aragon showed her own personality" ("el 
primer Estatuto, con cara.cter integrador y federal, con el que se 
propuso a Aragón como pueblo con personalidad propia"). 
The President of the Aragonese Autonomous Region took 
advantage of the occasion to announce that Aragon will forever defend 
the unity and prosperity of Spain, while always standing up for her 
own rights. He ended his speech repeating that "the sons of Aragon 
will be the first to defend solidarity, but they insist on receiving all the 
rights and privileges of home-rule granted by the Spanish 
Constitution." l have gone to some lengths summarizing the speeches 
made in Caspe in October 1993, to show how times have changed. 
What animated the nine arbitrators in 1412 were, in my opini on, 
considerations which were pragmatic at best -Fernando as the most 
"useful" king-, selfserving or mercenary at worst. None of the Nine 
was guided by a vision of a ressucitated Visigothic kingdom, no one 
was hoping that the electÏon of Fernando would lead quickly to the 
integration of the crowns of Aragon and CastÏle. Pidal, who as a boy 
had seen the first restoration of the monarchy, would have enjoyed 
watching a King being welcomed in Caspe. But, having opposed the 
concept of autonomous regions during the second Republic in 1931 (see 
THE 14 12 CASPE ARBITRATION: JUSTI CE, PLEBISCITE, OR MANIFEST DESTINY? 121 
Pérez 322), he would have hated the speeches. His need to believe in a 
strong and united Spain seems to me to be related to certain 
psychological processes. Reconstructing a glorious past for the 
Spanish nation, or idealizing the possibilities of an united Spain, is a 
comprehensible compensatory reaction during depressing times. 
Pidal, born in 1869, lived through the national spiritual crisis after the 
loss of Cuba, Spain's last possession in America. The myth of a better 
past, as a model for a better future, could also be an element in a self-
healing process after the Spanish Civil War. 
The belief in the myth of Castile and in the "absolute 
righteousness of her mission" (Díaz-Plaja, quoted by Hess 75; cf. 
Pérez 106) stimulated Pidal throughout his long and fruitfullife and 
explains many aspects of his work. Recently, Catherine Brown has 
shown convincingly that behind Pidal's reconstruction, to the point of 
(re)invention, of Spain's "lost" medieval epic there lied a desire to 
create unity out of fragments, the need to prove that Spain was never 
inferior to France in literature. But if rearranging literary data is a 
harmless academic exercise, manipulating historical facts can become 
dangerous demagoguery. 
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